# Observations on Observing, The Case Continues:

In today’s post, I am continuing from the last post, mainly using the ideas of Dirk Baecker. We noted that every observation is an operation of distinction, where an observer crosses a line, entering a marked state. This is shown in the schematic below. Here “a” refers to the marked state that the observer is interested in. The solid corner of a square is the distinction that was used by the observer, and “n” refers to the unmarked state. The entire schematic with the two sides and the three values (“a”, “n” and the distinction) are notated as a “form”. The first order observer is observing only the marked state “a”, and is not aware of or paying attention to the distinction(s) utilized. They are also not aware of the unmarked state “n”. When a second order observer enters the picture, they are able to see the entire form including the distinction employed by the first order observer.

However, it is important to note that the observation made by the second order observer is also a first order observation. This means that they also have a distinction and an unmarked state, another “n” that they are not aware of. Baecker explains this:

We have to bring in second-order observers in order to introduce consciousness or self-observation. Yet to be able to operate at all, these second-order observers must also be first-order observers… Second-order observers intervene as first-order observers, thereby presenting their own distinction to further second-order observation.

We also discussed the idea of “reentry” in our last post. Reentry is a means to provide closure so that the first order and second order observations taken together leads to a stable meaning.

So, to recap, the first order observer is interested in “a”.

The second order observer observes the first order observer, and understands that the first order observer made a distinction. They see where the first order observer is coming from, and the context of their observation. Let’s call the context as “b”. This will be the unmarked state for the first observer.

The second order observer engages with the first order observer in an ongoing back and forth discussion. The second order observer is able to combine both their “dealing with the world” approaches and come together to a nuanced understanding. This understanding is an effect of distinguishing “a” from “b”, and also combining “a” and “b” – an action of implication and negation taken together. This is an operation of sensemaking in the medium of meaning. This is depicted as the reentry in the schematic below.

Baecker explains reentry further:

Any operation that is able to look at both sides of the distinction – that is, at its form – is defined by Spencer Brown as an operation of reentry. It consists of reentering the distinction into the distinction, thereby splitting the same distinction into one being crossed and the same one being marked by another distinction that is deferred. The general idea of the reentry is to note and use the fact that distinctions occur in two versions: the distinction actually used, and the distinction looked at or reflected on.

Let’s look further at the form by using a famous syllogism from philosophy to further enhance our understanding:

All Men are Mortals;

Socrates is a man;

Therefore, Socrates is a mortal.

This can be depicted as a form as shown below:

By distinguishing Socrates from Men, and Men from Mortals, and by putting it all together, we get to “Socrates is Mortal”. In this case, we did not have to do a lot of work to come to the final conclusion. However, as the complexity increases, we will need to perform reentry on an ongoing basis to bring forth a stable meaning. Reentry introduces temporality to the sensemaking operation. No matter how many distinctions we employ, we can only get to a second order observation. All observations are in all actuality first order observations. And what is being distinguished is also dependent entirely on the observer.

I will also look at another example. A manager is required to maintain the operations of a plant while at the same time they need to make modifications to the operations to ensure that the plant can stay viable in an everchanging environment. In other words, the operations are maintained as consistent as possible until it needs to be changed. This can be depicted as shown below:

Another way to look at this is to view a plant as needing centralized structure as well as decentralized structure or top-down and bottom-up structure. This can be depicted as shown below. Here the two states are not shown as nested, but adjacent to each other.

Dirk Baecker saw a firm as follows:

Baecker notes that the product is the first distinction that we have to make. Our first distinction is the distinction of the product. Whatever else the firm may be doing, it has to recursively draw the distinction of which product it is to produce. This may be a material or immaterial, a tangible or intangible, an easy or difficult to define product, but it has to be a product that tells employees, managers and clients alike just what the firm is about. He continues- The technology is part of the form of the first distinction. Indeed, it is the outside or the first context of the first distinction, as observed by a second-order observer who may be the first-order observer observing him/herself. This means that a firm distinguishes only those products for which it has, or hopes to acquire, the necessary technology. Technology here means all kinds of ways of making sure that we can do what we want to do. This includes material access to resources, knowledge of procedures, technologies, availability of people to do the job and ways to convince society that you are doing what you are doing in the proper way.

Baecker explains “work” as follows:

We add the assumption of communication between first-order observers who at the same time act as second-order observers. The firm observes itself. By working, it relates products to technology and technology back to products.

Additional information can be found on Dirk Baecker’s The Form of the Firm.

In all that we have seen so far, we have not yet talked about the unmarked state. The unmarked state “n” is always present in the form and is not accessible to the observer. The observation can have as many distinctions as needed, dependent on the observer. The “n” represents everything that can be further added to the distinctions to improve our “meaning” as needed. The more distinctions there are, the more complex the observations. The observers deal with the complexity of the phenomena to be understood by applying as many or as few distinctions as needed.

We are able to better help with someone else’s problems because we can engage in second order observations. As second order observers, we can see the distinctions they made which are not accessible to them in the first order observation. The second order observer is able to understand the distinctions that the first order observer was able to make. The distinctions lay in the blind spots for the first order observer. The second order observation can be completed by the first order observer themselves as an operation of self-reflection. As cognitive beings, we must reproduce existing patterns by continually engaging with the external world, our local environment. We have to keep evaluating and adjusting these patterns on an ongoing self-correcting basis.

The basic structure of what we have discussed so far can be depicted as the following form:

We need to be mindful that there is always “n” that is not part of our observation. We may gain a better understanding of our distinctions if we engage in second order observation, but we will still not be able to access the unmarked state. We will not be able to access the unmarked state unless we create a new distinction in the unmarked state cutting “n” to a marked state and an unmarked state, yielding a new “n”. Second-order observation, noting one’s own distinctions, can lay the groundwork for epistemic humility.

This brings into question – how many distinctions are really needed? We will answer this with going to the first distinction we made. The first cross that we started with leading to the first distinction is the most important thing that we care about. Every other distinction is based on this first one. To answer – how many distinctions are really needed? – we need as many distinctions as needed until we are fully satisfied with our understanding. This includes understanding our blind spots and the distinctions we have made.

I will finish with a Peter Drucker story from Baecker. Peter Drucker was working with a hospital to improve their Emergency Room. Baecker noted that it took the hospital staff two days to come up with the first distinction, their “a”. Their “a” was to bring immediate relief to the afflicted. The afflicted needing relief may not always be the patient. In Drucker’s words:

Many years ago, I sat down with the administrators of a major hospital to think through the mission statement of the emergency room. It took us a long time to come up with the very simple, and (most people thought) too obvious statement that the emergency room was there to give assurance to the afflicted.

To do that well, you have to know what really goes on. And, much to the surprise of the physicians and nurses, it turned out that in a good emergency room, the function is to tell eight out of ten people there is nothing wrong that a good night’s sleep won’t take care of. You’ve been shaken up. Or the baby has the flu. All right, it’s got convulsions, but there is nothing seriously wrong with the child. The doctors and nurses give assurance.

We worked it out, but it sounded awfully obvious. Yet translating that mission statement into action meant that everybody who comes in is now seen by a qualified person in less than a minute. That is the mission; that is the goal. The rest is implementation.

Some people are immediately rushed to intensive care, others get a lot of tests, and yet others are told: “Go back home, go to sleep, take an aspirin, and don’t worry. If these things persist, see a physician tomorrow.” But the first objective is to see everybody, almost immediately — because that is the only way to give assurance.

This post is also available as a podcast – https://anchor.fm/harish-jose/episodes/Observations-on-Observing–The-Case-Continues-e15kpc1

Please maintain social distance and wear masks. Please take vaccination, if able. Stay safe and Always keep on learning…

In case you missed it, my last post was The Case of the Distinguished Observer:

## 4 thoughts on “Observations on Observing, The Case Continues:”

1. janlelie says:

I always like your posts. And know all your references. At the same time, I cannot use “distinction” nor “observer”, because I consider them as fictitious, inveneted.
What you’re calling “making a distinction” and “observer” precedes communicating about distinguishing and observing. For instance, (drawing of a hand pointing at a| mark) – i don’t know how to add a drawing) needs no words.
In communicating – without words – one obviously makes distinctions while observing distinctions being made (by one self). One cannot not distinguish without observing nor observe without distinguishing. Behaving consists of observing while distinguishing. I’ll call this communicating, obviously.
One cannot not communicate (see also Watzlawick – Pragmatics of Human Communication). To communicate is to distinguish and observe. One induces one-self from communicating – as an observing distinguish-er and a distinguished observer. All still without using language.

On translating distinctions and observations into language one again makes distinctions: making observations into distinguished words. Calling (drawing of pointing hand) “pointing at”.
In doing so, one “calls” into being “us”. Inventing a language requires “an other one”. The word “other” – in Dutch “ander” – also means two. To quote another book title by Spencer-Brown: “Only Two Can Play this Game”.

We determine our language together – with others – and in doing so, distinguish “us” from “them”. (I’ll later show how inadvertently this leads to our current dire straits group life, as we confuse words with meanings).

In the current way of using English language in communicating, we usually use a noun for a process. We tend to make a reification. Like using “communication” for communicating, trust for trusting, organization for organizing, … .
But communication is not a real thing, so it cannot be distinguished; one can not (drawing of pointing hand) (point at) ‘communication’ (only observe). Communication – not the word, but the thing – is a fiction. The same is true for organization and – by the way – system. A system is also a useful fiction, but not a real thing.

I prefer to keep using verbs for processes, like “communicating”, “organizing”, “distinguishing” and “observing”. You may notice that I don’t distinguish – differentiate – between communicating, distinguishing and observing. And I can add “behaving”. For me, they’re just different words for the same “no-thing”.
(Words don’t contain meaning. This is a common misunderstanding; communication should be considered dangerous to convey meaning. Relationships classifies meanings and these are obviously transferred through interpunctions.)

The verb I use with systems is “thinking”. In thinking using language we (un)intentionally create “systems”, because we happen to be told to use this noun for a process of interrelating processes. The way to be accepted by “systems thinkers” is to pretend systems really exist. (When someone said to me, “a system is a whole, more than the sum of its parts”. I used to ask: “yes, but who made it into parts?”)

So, I’ll use distinguishing and observing, observing that all observing distinguishes and all distinguishing observes. So I cannot not distinguish (differentiate, discern,…) without observing (detecting, seeing, …). So what distinguishes distinguishing from observing? I do. (I could have written i!). One distinguishes / observes one-self – in both meanings.

I observe, that the so-called re-entry isn’t necessary to explain the existence of an observer. Making a distinction – distinguishing – between distinction and observer – observing -, already made it thus. I’m already ready, ready to distinguish and observe you too and you’re too.

I referred to “Only Two Can Play This Game”. I suddenly realized while writing this – after all these years – that, without knowing Spencer-Brown in this story, shows – inadvertently -, the restrictive role “others” play in the game of languaging. Our (current) use of language restricts our thinking because we’re been instructed to use nouns where verbs should do the work.

Like

• Harish says: