Hammurabi, Hawaii and Icarus:

patent

In today’s post, I will be looking at Human Error. In November 2017, The US state of Hawaii reinstated the Cold War era nuclear warning signs due to the growing fears of a nuclear attack from North Korea. On January 13, 2018, an employee from the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency sent out an alert through the communication system – “BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT INBOUND TO HAWAII. SEEK IMMEDIATE SHELTER. THIS IS NOT A DRILL.” The employee was supposed to take part in a drill where the emergency missile warning system is tested. The alert message was not supposed to go to the general public. The cause for the mishap was soon determined to be human error. The employee in the spotlight and few others left the agency soon afterwards. Even the Hawaiian governor, David Ige, came under scrutiny because he had forgotten his Twitter password and could not update his Twitter feed about the false alarm. I do not have all of the facts for this event, and it would not be right of me to determine what went wrong. Instead, I will focus on the topic of human error.

One of the first proponents of the concept of human error in the modern times is the American Industry Safety pioneer, Herbert William Heinrich. In his seminal 1931 book, Industrial Accident Prevention, he proposed the concept of Domino theory to explain industry accidents. Heinrich reviewed several industrial accidents of his time, and came up with the following percentages for proximate causes:

  • 88% are from unsafe acts of persons (human error),
  • 10% are from unsafe mechanical or physical conditions, and
  • 2% are “acts of God” and unpreventable.

The reader may find it interesting to learn that Heinrich was working as the Assistant Superintendent of the Engineering and Inspection Division of Travelers Insurance Company, when we wrote the book in 1931. The data that Heinrich collected was somehow lost after the book was published. Heinrich’s domino theory explains an injury from an accident as a linear sequence of events associated with five factors – Ancestry and social environment, Fault of person, Unsafe act and/or mechanical or Unsafe performance of persons, Accident and Injury.

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He hypothesized that taking away one domino from the chain can prevent the industrial injury from happening. He wrote – If one single factor of the entire sequence is to be selected as the most important, it would undoubtedly be the one indicated by the unsafe act of the person or the existing mechanical hazard. I was taken aback by the example he gave to illustrate his point. As an example, he talked about an operator fracturing his skull as the result of a fall from a ladder. The investigation revealed that the operator descended the ladder with his back to it and caught his heel on one of the upper rungs. Heinrich noted that the effort to train and instruct him and to supervise his work was not effective enough to prevent this unsafe practice.  “Further inquiry also indicated that his social environment was conducive to the forming of unsafe habits and that his family record was such as to justify the belief that reckless tendencies had been inherited.

One of the main criticisms to Heinrich’s Domino model is its simplistic nature to explain a complex phenomenon. The Domino model is reflective of the mechanistic view prevalent at that time. The modern view of “human error” is based on cognitive psychology and systems thinking. In this view, accidents are seen as a by-product of the normal functioning of the sociotechnical system. Human error is seen as a symptom and not a cause. This new view uses the approach of “no-view” when it comes to human error. This means that the human error should not be its own category for a root cause. The process is not perfectly built, and the human variability that might result in a failure is the same that results in the ongoing success of the process. The operator has to adapt to meet the unexpected challenges, pressures and demands that arise on a day-to-day basis. The use of human error as a root cause is a fundamental attribution error – focusing on the human trait of the operator as being reckless or careless; rather than focusing on the situation that the operator was in.

One concept that may help in explaining this further is Local Rationality. Local Rationality starts with the basic assumption that everybody wants to do a good job, and we try to do the best (be rational) with the information that is available to us at a given time. If this decision led to an error, instead of looking at where the operator went wrong, we need to look at why he made the decisions that made sense to him at that point in time. The operator is in the “sharp end” of the system. James Reason, Professor Emeritus of Psychology at the University of Manchester in England, came up with the concept of Sharp End and Blunt End. Sharp end is similar to the concept of Gemba in Lean, where the actual action is taking place. This is mainly where the accident happens and is thus in the spotlight during an investigation. Blunt end, on the other hand, is removed and away in space and time. The blunt end is responsible for the policies and constraints that shape the situation for the sharp end. The blunt end consists of top management, regulators, administrators etc. Professor Reason noted that the blunt end of the system controls the resources and constraints that confront the practitioner at the sharp end, shaping and presenting sometimes conflicting incentives and demands. The operators in the sharp end of the sociotechnical system inherits the defects in the system due to the actions and policies set by blunt end and can be the last line of defense instead of being the main proponents or instigators of the accidents. Professor Reason also noted that – rather than being the main instigators of an accident, operators tend to be the inheritors of system defects. Their part is that of adding the final garnish to a lethal brew whose ingredients have already been long in the cooking. I encourage the reader to research the works of Jens Rasmussen, James Reason, Erik Hollnagel and Sydney Dekker since I have tried to only scratch the surface.

Final Words:

Perhaps the oldest source of human error causation is the Code of Hammurabi, the code of ancient Mesopotamian laws dating back to 1754 BC. The Code of Hammurabi consisted of 282 laws. Some examples of human error are given below.

  • If a builder builds a house for someone, and does not construct it properly, and the house which he built falls in and kill its owner, then that builder shall be put to death.
  • If a man rents his boat to a sailor, and the sailor is careless, and the boat is wrecked or goes aground, the sailor shall give the owner of the boat another boat as compensation.
  • If a man lets in water and the water overflows the plantation of his neighbor, he shall pay ten gur of corn for every ten gan of land.

I will finish off with the story of Icarus. In Greek mythology, Icarus was the creator of the labyrinth in the island of Minos. Icarus’ father was the master craftsman Daedalus. King Minos of Crete imprisoned Daedalus and Icarus in Crete. The ingenious Daedalus observed the birds flying and invented a set of wings made from bird feathers and candle wax. He tested the wings out and made a pair for his son Icarus. Daedalus and Icarus planned their escape. Daedalus was a good Engineer since he studied the failure modes of his design and identified the limits. Daedalus instructed Icarus to follow him closely and asked him to not fly too close to the sea since the moisture can dampen the wings, and not fly too close to the sun since the heat from sun can melt the wings. As the story goes, Icarus was excited with his ability to fly and got carried away (maybe reckless). He flew too close to the sun, and the wax melted from his wings causing him to fall down to his untimely death.

Perhaps, the death of Icarus could be viewed as a human error since he was reckless and did not follow directions. However, Stephen Barlay in his 1969 book, Aircrash Detective: International Report on the Quest for Air Safety, looked at this story closely. At the high altitude that Icarus was flying, the temperature will actually be cold rather than warm. Thus, the failure would actually be from the cold temperature that would make the wax brittle and break instead of wax melting as indicated in the story. If this was true, during cold weathers the wings would have broken down and Icarus would have died at another time even if he had followed his father’s advice.

Always keep on learning…

In case you missed it, my last post was A Fuzzy 2018 Wish

4 thoughts on “Hammurabi, Hawaii and Icarus:

  1. Thank you again. Interesting thoughts on human error. I recently completed a full series of posts on problem-solving in Lean, based on a method I learned via Shell and one of their contractors. I used an example to explain the approach. And like the viewpoints you express, I also see Lean problem-solving focused on improving the system of work in which operators work. We do not seek to blame the individual person. We should establish adequate standards and improve these continually. These constitute the system of work and should as such prevent problems (incl. accidents) or detect out-of-standard situations before accidents happen.
    Non-adherence to these standards, in my opinion, can only be prevented when there is an effective standard for detection that will keep a person from making an error, i.e., a control poka-yoke. If we cannot conceive a control poka-yoke, you can only minimize the risk. Error-proofing standards, for me, also represents an aspect of respect for humanity in Lean thinking.
    You can read the series of six posts on my blog at http://dumontis.com/2017/11/root-condition-analysis-6/ (which is the sixth post of the series).

    Like

    • Hi Rob,
      Thank you for your comment and thoughts.

      I am looking forward to read your posts. A well defined process should have standards, monitoring and poka yoke. Monitoring and poka yoke are both feedback devices.

      Thanks again,
      Harish

      Like

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